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In  this  study,  we  test  whether  the  overconfidence  bias  explains  several  stylized  market  anomalous, 
including a short term continuation (momentum), a long term reversal in stock returns, high levels of trading 
volume and excessive volatility. Using data of French stocks market, we find empirical evidence in support of 
overconfidence hypothesis. First, based on a restricted VAR framework, we show that overconfident investors 
overreact to private information and underreact to public information. Second, by performing Granger causality 
tests of stock returns and trading volume, we find that overconfident investors trade more aggressively in periods 
subsequent to market gains. Third, based on a two GARCH specifications, we show that self attribution bias, 
conditioned by right forecasts, increases investors overconfidence and trading volume. Fourth, the analysis of the 
relation between return volatility and trading volume shows that the excessive trading of overconfident investors 
makes a contribution to the observed excessive volatility. 
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1. Introduction 
Some fascinating events in financial markets, such as a short term continuation (momentum) 
and a long term reversal in stock returns, high levels of trading volume and excessive volatility cannot 
be explained by traditional models based on investors’ rationality. A developing strand of the finance 
literature [Benos, (1998), Daniel et al., (1998), and Odean, (1998)] proposes theoretical models built 
on the assumption of investor overconfidence to account for these observed anomalies.  
Daniel  Hirshleifer  and  Subrahmanyam  (1998)  develop  a  behavioural  model  based  on  the 
assumption  that  investors  display  overconfidence  and  self attribution  bias.  In  their  model,  the 
informed traders attribute the performance of ex post winners to their stock selection skills and that 
the ex post losers to bad luck. As result, these investors become overconfident about their ability to 
pick  winners  and  thereby  overestimate  the  precision  of  their  signals.  Based  on  their  increased 
confidence in their signals, they push up the price of the winners above the fundamental value. The 
delayed overreaction in this model leads to momentum profits that are eventually reversed as prices 
revert to their fundamentals (reversals).  
According  to  Gervais  and  Odean  (2001)  overconfidence  is  enhanced  in  investors  that 
experience high returns, even when those returns are simultaneously enjoyed by the entire market. 
Odean (1998) and Gervais and Odean (2001) suggest that intertemporal changes in trading volume are 
the primary testable implication of overconfidence theory.  
Moreover, overconfidence is proposed as an important reason for excessive price volatility. 
Benos  (1998)  proposes  a  model  in  which  overconfident  traders’  aggressive  exploitation  of  their 
profitable information, together with rational traders’ conservative trading strategy, leads prices to 
move too much in one or the other direction. In their model, Daniel Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 
(1998) show that overconfident investors increases prices volatility at the time reception of private 
signals.  
In  this  study,  we  attempt  to  identify  the  contribution  of  overconfidence  bias  to  explaining 
several stylized market anomalous (momentum, reversals, excessive trading volume and excessive 
volatility). For this end, four hypotheses derived from overconfidence previous theoretical work are 
tested:  H1,  overconfident  investors  overreact  to  private  information  and  underreact  to  public 
information. H2, market gains (losses) make overconfident investors trade more (less) aggressively in  Journal of Applied Economic Sciences  
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subsequent  periods.  H3,  self attribution  bias,  conditioned  by  right  forecasts,  increases  investors 
overconfidence and trading volume. H4, the excessive trading of overconfident investors makes a 
contribution to the observed excessive volatility. 
Our  contribution  is  to  provide  the  empirical  evidence  on  various  implications  of  the 
overconfidence hypothesis by focusing on aggregate French market behaviour. 
The  methodology  followed  in  this  study  considers  various  empirical  frameworks.  First,  a 
Bivariate  Vector  Autoregression  is  employed  to  study  the  impulse  responses  of  stock  returns  to 
private and public information shocks. Second, Granger causality tests are used for testing the relation 
between returns and trading volume. Then, two GARCH (EGARCH and GJR GARCH) models are 
used  to  evaluate  the  effect  of  investors’  error  forecasts  on  their  overconfidence.  Finally,  the 
conditional  variance  of  GARCH  models  is  estimated  by  introducing  two  components  of  trading 
volume. The first component, due to past stock returns, is related to investors’ overconfidence. The 
second component is unrelated to investors’ overconfidence. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the hypotheses and 
empirical methodology. Section 3 describes empirical data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypotheses and empirical methodology  
2.1. Overconfidence and differential reaction to information   
DHS  (1998)  and  Gervais  and  Odean  (2001)  models  predict  that  overconfident  investors 
overestimate the precision of their own valuation abilities, in the sense that they overestimate the 
precision of their private information signals  As a result, they make investment decisions by relying 
on their own private signals while they ignore public signals. Based on these theoretical predictions, 
we derive the first hypothesis, H1, written as follows: 
H1.  Overconfident  investors  overreact  to  private  information  and  underreact  to  public 
information.    
To identify private and public information, the methodology presented by Chuang and Lee, 
(2006)  is  considered.  A  structural  VAR  (Vector  Autoregression)  model  is  employed.  Consider  a 
vector  t γ ( [ ] t t t V ,r γ
′
= ) consisting of two stationary variables:  trading volume  t V and stock return t r  
series. Based on the Wold theorem, the vector  t γ  has a Bivariate Moving Average Representation 
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t ε and 
public
t ε are  respectively  the  private  and  the  public  information  shock.    ij b ( L) 
represent the effect of shocks on the trading volume and the stock returns. The shocks on private and 
public  information  are  distinguished  by  a  restriction  imposed  on  the  BMAR.    That  is,  private 
information shock has a contemporaneous impact on trading volume, while public information shock 
has no contemporaneous impact on trading volume. This restriction is motivated by several theoretical 
considerations and it can be formally written as follows:  
 
12 12 0 0 0 b (k ) k b ( ) = = =                                                                                                            (2)                                                 
 
On the one hand, the DHS (1998) overconfidence model shows that excessive trading volume is 
primarily  due  to  investor’s  overreaction  to  their  private  signals  and  their  underraction  to  public 
information.  In  addition,  Campbell  et  al.  (1993)  show  that  public  information  does  not  affect 
significantly market trading volume [Chuang and Lee, (2006)]. 
Really, the BMAR is derived by inverting a Bivariate Vector Autoregression (BVAR), given by 
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The relation between the BVAR model [Eq. (1)] and the BMAR model [Eq. (3)] is described in 
the Chuang and Lee (2006) study. 
Once a restricted BVAR model of trading volume and stock return is estimated, we can analyze 
the stock return responses to private and public information shocks to see whether the responses are 
compatible with the prediction of the overconfidence hypothesis (H1). 
 
2.2.  Overconfidence and trading volume  
Several studies consider the proposition that investor overconfidence generate the high trading 
volume observed in financial markets [Odean, (1998a, 1998b, 1999), Gervais, and Odean, (2001)]. 
Gervais,  and  Odean,  (2001)  and  Odean,  (1998)  theoretical  models  predict  that  high  total  market 
returns make some investors overconfident about the precision of their information. Although the 
returns are market wide, investors mistakenly attribute gains in wealth to their ability to pick stocks. 
Overconfident investors trade more frequently in subsequent periods because of inappropriately tight 
error bounds around return forecasts. Alternatively, market losses reduce investor overconfidence and 
trading, although perhaps not in a symmetric fashion. Thus, the second hypothesis of overconfidence 
predicts a causality running from stock returns to trading volume. 
H2.  Market  gains  (losses)  make  overconfident  investors  trade  more  (less)  aggressively  in 
subsequent periods. 
To identify the relation between stock returns and trading volume, we use a bivariate Granger 
causality  test.  Formally,  if  the  prediction  of  Y  using  past  values  of  X  is  more  accurate  than  the 
prediction without using X in the mean square error sense (
2
1 1 t t t t t (Y ) Y X ) σ − −     − p , where  t   is 
the information set at time t), then X Granger causes Y. 
The specification of used test is as follows: 
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where, t r  is the market return,  t r is the absolute value of  t r and MADt  denotes the mean absolute 
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where, it r  is the return of stocks i. 
We choose the number of lag, p, by considering the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
Schwarz criterion.  
The  first  control  variable, t r ,  is  based  on  Karpoff’s  (1987)  survey  of  research  on  the 
contemporaneous volume–volatility relationship. The second control variable, MADt is motivated by 
Ross  (1989)  intuition  that  in  a  frictionless  market  characterized  by  an  absence  of  arbitrage 
opportunities, the rate of information flow is revealed by the degree of price volatility.  
To test the overconfidence hypothesis, we focus on the null hypothesis that stock returns do not 
Granger cause trading volume. The rejection of the null hypothesis ( 12 j β = 0, for any j) authenticating 
our second hypothesis. Moreover, the rejection of the null hypothesis that trading volume does not  Journal of Applied Economic Sciences  
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Granger cause stock returns ( 21j β = 0, for any j) will be an evidence against the market efficiency 
(trading  volume  is  not  a  fundamental  variable  of  the  firm).  The  presence  of  a  feedback  relation 
between stock returns and trading volume provides evidence in favor of positive feedback trading. 
 
2.3.  Self-attribution and investors’ overconfidence  
Another central aspect of the overconfidence related finance literature that we consider is the 
biased  self attribution;  the  tendency  of  the  individuals  to  attribute  good  outcomes  to  their  own 
qualities and bad outcomes to bad luck or other factors. The self attribution bias is considered by 
some  behavioral  models  that  attempt  to  provide  a  theoretical framework  for  the empirical return 
anomalies documented in the finance literature [DHS, (1998); Gervais and Odean, (2001)]. According 
to DHS (1998) model, investor overconfidence varies because of biased self attribution, which means 
that when investors receive confirming public information, their confidence level increases, but when 
they receive disconfirming public information; their confidence level falls only modestly.  
On the empirical level, biased self attribution leads investors to become overconfident after a 
good  past  performance  [Gervais  and  Odean,  (2001)].  Consequently,  trading  volume  is  greater 
positively  correlated  with  past  stock  returns  conditional  on  investors’  right  forecasts,  than  that 
conditional on their wrong forecasts. Indeed, if investors make a right forecast in that they predict 
positive  stock  returns  at  time  t 1  and  realized  stock  returns  are  positive  at  time  t,  then  their 
overconfidence rises significantly and, consequently, they trade more actively in subsequent periods. 
If, on the other hand, investors make a wrong forecast in that they predict negative stock returns at 
time t 1 and realized stock returns are positive at time t, then their overconfidence may fall only 
modestly  because  they  still  benefit  from  market  gains  [Chuang  and  Lee,  (2006)].  We  therefore 
formally state the third hypothesis as follows: 
H3:   Self attribution bias, conditioned by right forecasts, increases investors’ overconfidence 
and their trading volume. 
To  empirically  test  this  hypothesis,  we  use  two  different  GARCH type  specifications 
(EGARCH and GJR GARCH) taking into account an asymmetric effect in which a negative return 
shock increases volatility more than does a positive return shock (leverage effect). Equations 6 and 7 
represent respectively EGARCH [Nelson, (1991)] and GJR GARCH [Glosten, et al. (1993)] models: 
 
t t t r   η = +                                                                                                                          (6)  



















where  t    and  t h represent respectively the expected return and conditional volatility.  
The asymmetric effect in EGARCH model is represented by the volatility parameter κ . If κ < 
0, then conditional volatility tend to increase (to decrease) when the standardized residual is negative 
(positive). 
 
t t t r   η = +                                                                                                                          (7)  
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where  1 t S
−
− = 1 if  1 t η − 0 p  and  1 t S
−
− = 0 so not. 
The asymmetric effect in the GJR GARCH model is represented by the volatility parameterθ . 
If   0 θ f  then a negative shock has an impact on conditional volatility superior than does a positive 
shock. 
To allow for the possibility of non normality of the returns distribution, we assume that the 
conditional  errors  of  EGARCH  and  GJR GARCH  specifications  follow  a  Generalized  Error   16 
Distribution,  GED.  The  two  different GARCH type specifications permit  decomposing  the  stocks 
returns into expected and unexpected returns.  
To test whether the self attribution bias hypothesis can explain the investors’ overconfidence 
dynamic, we estimate the following regression: 
( )
( )
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where  t η is the unexpected return (or forecast error) derived from the GARCH specifications and  t η  
is the absolute value of  t η . The dummy variable  t j I
+
− takes on a value of one if  1 0 t t r   − × f  in which 
t    is the expected returns derived from the GARCH specifications, and zero, otherwise.  
The  j β   and  j γ   coefficients  are  designed  to  measure  the  effect  of  self attribution  bias  on 







= = ∑ ∑ f . The absolute value of forecast error  t η  is designed to measure the effect of the 
investors’ forecasts precision on their overconfidence. If investors are overconfident, we expect the j λ  
coefficients to be negative. 
 
2. 4. Overconfidence and volatility   
Overconfidence  has  been  advanced  as an  explanation for the observed  excessive volatility. 
Odean (1998), Gervais and Odean (2001) show that the volatility is increasing in a trader’s number of 
past success and thereby in a level of investors’ overconfidence. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis 
associated with overconfidence can be written as follows:   
H4.  The excessive  trading of overconfident investors  makes  a  contribution  to the observed 
excessive volatility. 
The relation between volatility and trading volume was the subject of many prior researches 
[Lamoureux  and  Lastrapes,  (1990);  Schwert,  (1989);  Benos,  (1998);  Albulescu,  (2007)].  The 
objective of testing empirically our fourth hypothesis is to distinguish excessive trading volume of 
overconfident investors from other factors that affect volatility. In the one stage of the test procedure, 
the trading volume is decomposed into one component related to investors’ overconfidence (OVER) 
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In the second stage, we include these two components of trading volume into the conditional 
variance equation of EGARCH and GJR GARCH models, respectively as follows: 
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1 1 2 1 1 1 t t t t t h f ( ) f h S ( ) ω η θ η
−
− − − − = + + + + 3 4 t f NONOVER f OVER +  
   
The  parameter 4 f   represents  the  effect  of  overconfidence  on  volatility  and  the  parameter 
3 f measures the effect of other factors on excessive volatility.  
 
3.  Data and descriptive statistics 
Our sample consists of 120 French stocks traded in the Paris stocks exchange from January 
1995 to December 2004. Data used in this empirical study are price, trading volume and turnover 
ratio.  We  use  daily  data  to  construct  monthly  market  variables;  notably,  trading  volume  (Volt), 
turnover ratio (Tovt), and return (rt). Our choice of monthly variables is justified by the fact that the 
investors’ overconfidence level change on the monthly or yearly horizons [Odean, (1998), Gervais 
and Odean, (2001) and Statman et al. (2003)]. Our focus on aggregate investor behavior is motivated 
in  part  by  the  argument  of  Odean  (1998),  DHS  (2001),  Gervais  and  Odean  (2001)  that  investor 
behavior should be observable in market level data, and in other part by the idea of Kyle and Wang 
(1997), Benos (1998), DHS (1998), Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) and Wang (2001) that overconfident 
investors can survive and dominate the markets in the long run. 










= ∑                                                                                                                       (12)   
 
where rit  is the i stock return in t and N represents the number of sample stocks.   
The turnover is defined as the ratio of the number of shares traded in a month to the number of 
shares outstanding at the end of the month. The use of trading volume and turnover is justified by the 
considerable increases of trades’ number. Moreover, one problem with using the number of share 
traded as a measure of trading volume is that it is unscaled and, therefore, highly correlated with firm 
size [Chordia and Swaminathan, (2000)].  
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) present, respectively, monthly turnover ratio and trading volume, from 
January 1995 to December 2004. Trading volume gradually increased to reach its maximum during 
the period of November 1999 until November 2002. 
  


























































Table 1 presents summary statistics on monthly market variables: return, turnover and trading volume. 
The normality test results show that the three variables distributions are not normal (Skewness ≠ 0 and kurtosis ≠ 
(a)  (b)   18 
3). The results of stationary test show that the monthly returns and trading volume series are stationary. About the 
turnover ratio, Dickey and Fuller statistic (ADF test) is higher than critical value, which means that the series is 
non stationary and exhibit a trend. Hodrick Prescott (1997) algorithm is used to detrending this series.  
 
Table1. Market descriptive statistics 
 
  Return  Turnover   Trading volume 
Mean   0.0107  0.0017  9263384 
Standard deviation  0.0360  0.0009  5775993 
Min   0.1053  0.0004  1150292 
Max  0.0901  0.0036  20563872 
kurtosis  3.8096  1.5561  1.7266 
Skewness   0.5889  1.305  0.06813 
Jarque  and Bera  10.153  10.675  8.2002 
ADF test   8.0367  0.968   9.98 
 Critical value (1%)   4.0407   3.4885   3.449 
Source: (own) 
This table presents market descriptive statistics for monthly return, turnover and trading volume, from 
January 1995 to December 2004. The table reports, the mean, standard deviation, minimal value, maximum 
value, Skewness  statistic,  kurtosis  statistic,  Jarque  and Bera statistic, ADF statistic (Augmented Dickey and 
Fuller) and critical value of ADF test. 
 
4. Empirical results   
4.1. Overconfidence and information differential reaction: Hypothesis 1  
In  this  section,  we  report  the  empirical  results  of  the  first  overconfidence  hypothesis.  To 
estimate  the  BVAR  of  yt,  we  have  to  choose  the  number  of  lags  in  each  equation.  Formal 
overconfidence theories do not specify a time frame for the relationship between returns and trading 
volume, so we let the data determine the number of monthly lags to include. Specifically, we set five 
lag (k= 5) based on both Schwartz Information Criteria (SIC) and Akaike Criteria (AIC).  Two cases 
are considered to measure Vt series: the turnover, (Tovt) and the trading volume (Volt). 
Figures 2 and 3 present the impulse responses of returns rt to one standard deviation shocks on 
public and private information, 
public
t ε and 
private
t ε , respectively for Volt [Figures 2(a) and 2(b)] and 
Tovt [Figures 3(a) and 3(b)]. The shocks on public and private information are orthogonalized using 
Cholesky decomposition. The dynamic responses of rt are measured by standard deviations of this 
variable over 15 months. The figures present a conditional band of the standard error, computed with 
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Figure 2. Response of stock returns to private and public information shocks, Vt = Volt   
(a)  (b)  Journal of Applied Economic Sciences  
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Figure 3.  Response of stock returns to private and public information shocks, Vt = Tovt ,  
 
 Source: (own) 
 
Figures  2(a)  and  3(a)  illustrate  under reaction  of  returns  to  public  information  shocks. 
However, an overreaction of returns to private information shocks is showed in Figures 2(b) and 3(b). 
After an initial under reaction, stocks prices reach their equilibrium through a correction process. 
Investors’ under  and overreaction to information can work together or independently to generate 
short term price continuation returns (momentum) and their long term reversals. Indeed, overconfident 
investors buy stock which progressed  while thinking that market did not sufficiently evaluated it 
compared to their private information. The returns progress beyond their value suggested by public 
information.  The  correction  intervenes  in  long  run  when  public  information  becomes  such  as  it 
eclipses the private signals.  
 
4.2. Overconfidence and trading volume:  Hypothesis 2   
Table  2  summarizes  an  estimation  of  Granger  causality  test  in  two  panels.  In  Panel  A, 
dependent variables vector is constituted of trading volume and returns [ ] t t Vol ,r
′
. In Panel B vector of 
dependent variables is formed by turnover ratio and returns[ ] t t Tov ,r
′
. The estimation results provide 
confirming evidence that stock returns positively Granger cause investors’ confidence. In addition, 
the cumulative effect of lagged monthly stock returns on trading volume is positive and significantly 
different from zero. Moreover, the predictive power in term of 
2
R  coefficient is higher for the Tovt 
and Volt dependent variables compared to that of rt. This result is consistent with the overconfidence 
hypothesis suggesting that market gains help to envisage a trading volume increase. 
 
Table 2. Bivariate causality tests of trading volume and stock returns 
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
Dependent  
Variable  
                Tovt                                    rt              Volt                                 rt 
Independent  
Variable   Tovt j  rt j  rt j  Tovt j  Volt j  rt j  rt j  Volt j 
2
1 χ  
(p value) 
  11.3445 
(0.029)    8.7431 
(0.0679)    11.254 
(0.024)    11.254 
(0.0185) 
coefficients ∑   0.8519  0.0003  0.117   17.953  0.993  3.5893  0.089   0.005 
(b)  (a)   20 
  Panel A  Panel B 
2




















2 R   0.951  0.145  0.929  0.211 




This table presents the results of Granger causality test estimate: 
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where  t V is the market  trading volume (Tovt or Volt ) and  t r is the market return,  t r is the absolute 
value  of  t r and  MADt  represents  the  mean  absolute  cross sectional  return  deviation.  The 
2
1 χ   test 
statistic is  used to  test the double Granger causality. The
2
2 χ  test statistic is used to test the null 
hypothesis that the sum of the estimated coefficients is equal to zero. The p value is the probability of 
obtaining the value of the corresponding test statistic or higher under the null hypothesis. 
2
R  is the 
adjusted  coefficient  of  determination.  Q(6)  is  the  Ljung Box  Q statistic  used  to  test  the  joint 
significance of the autocorrelations up to 6 lags for the residuals in each regression. 
 
4.3. Overconfidence and self-attribution bias  
Results  of  the  EGARCH  and  GJR GARCH  models  estimation  are  shown  in  table  3.  An 
asymmetric relationship between returns and volatility is noted. Indeed, negative return shocks of a 
given magnitude have larger impact on volatility than positive return shocks of the same magnitude. 
The  GARCH  estimator  parameter  2 f   is  significantly  positive  for  EGARCH  and  GJR GARCH 
models. Consequently, the current returns variance is strongly related to that of previous period. 
 
Table 3. Univariate EGARCH and GJR GARCH regression parameters 
 
Model  EGARCH  GJR-GARCH 
Parameter  Coefficient  Z  statistic  Coefficient  Z  statistic 
ω    1.7286   1.6763  0.0003  1.8947 
1 f    0.0584   0.3298   0.1527   2.0528 
κ (θ  GJR  GARCH)   0.2297   2.1077  0.1893  2.2423 




This  table  presents  the  results  of  the  EGARCH  and  GJR GARCH  conditional  variance 
estimation: 
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and  
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where,  t r is the market return,  t   is the expected return and  t h represents conditional volatility.  
 
In order to show the asymmetric response of volatility to good and bad news, we present in 
figure 4 the estimated news impact curve. This figure displays positive and negative shocks impact on 
EGARCH conditional variance. It is clear that bad news (negative shock) tends to increase volatility 
more than good news (positive shock). 
 




























The  unexpected  return  η ,  derived  from  GARCH  models  are  then  used  to  study  the  self 
attribution effect on trading volume. Table 4 presents estimation of Eq. (8) in two panels. In panel A, 
the expected and unexpected returns (η  and  ) are derived from the EGARCH model. In panel B, 
these  returns  are  derived  from  the  GJR GARCH  model.  Two  types  of  dependent  variables  are 
considered in each panel, turnover, Tovt and trading volume, Volt. The regression is estimated by 
adopting the lag length of 3. The reason of this choice is due to the fact that our analysis from the 
bivariate Granger causality tests shows that the most significant positive causal relation between stock 
returns and trading volume concentrates on the first three months. 
The  estimation  results  show  that  the  sum  of  j β   coefficients  which  captures  the  effect  of 
investors’ overconfidence on trading volume when they make right forecasts, is positive and the null 
hypothesis that
3
1 0 j j β
= = ∑ , is rejected. While, the sum of  j γ  coefficients that measures the same 
effect when investors make wrong forecasts is negative and the null hypothesis that
3 3
1 1 j j j j β γ
= = = ∑ ∑ , 
is rejected. Consequently, the right and the wrong forecasts do not have the same effect on trading 
volume. The reception of information which confirms investors’ forecasts tends to accentuate their 
overconfidence  ( 1 2 3 β β β + + >0)  while  information  which  contradicts  their  forecast  decreases  their 
confidence ( 1 2 3 γ γ γ + + <0). This result suggests that French investors are subject to self attribution   22 
bias.  This  bias  leads  them  to  become  more  overconfident  and trade  more aggressively following 
market gains as they make right forecasts of future stock returns. 
 
Table 4. Relationship between trading volume and stock returns conditional on investor’s forecasts 
 
Source of    and η  Panel A : ARMA (1.1)-EGARCH (1.1)  Panel B : ARMA (1.1)- GJR-GARCH (1.1) 
Dependent Variable  Tovt  Volt  Tovt  Volt 
1 2 3 β β β + +   32.776  7.479  40.408  27.036 
2
β(1) χ        (p value)  7.562        (0.006)  1.581          (0.208)  11.072         (0.000)  4.720          (0.029) 
2
β( 2 ) χ       (p value)  8.519        (0.036)  2.16           (0.539)  12.231         (0.006)  5.230          (0.155) 
1 2 3 γ γ γ + +    0.414   8.6   12.033   9.4 
2
γ(1) χ        (p value)  6.460         0.011)  3.669          (0.055)  7.961           (0.004)  4.626          (0.031) 
2
γ( 2 ) χ        (p value)  7.248        (0.064)  4.141          (0.246)  9.075           (0.028)  5.4601        (0.141) 
1 2 3 λ λ λ + +    0.557   0.373   0.596   0.146 
2
λ(1) χ        (p value)  4.503        (0.033)  1.943          (0.163)  5.805           (0.016)  3.169          (0.075) 
2
λ( 2 ) χ       (p value)  4.509        (0.211)  2.052          (0.561)  5.837           (0.119)  3.234          (0.357) 
2
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∑ ∑
    
                                                        
where  t V is the market  trading volume (Tovt or Volt) and  t r is the market return,  t r is the absolute 
value of  t r and MADt represents the mean absolute cross sectional return deviation.  t η  is the absolute 
value of the unexpected return (or forecast error) at month t derived from GARCH (EGARCH and 
GJR GARCH) specifications. The dummy variable t j I
+
−  takes on a value of one if t 1 t r 0   − × f  in which 
t 1   − denotes the monthly expected return at month t 1, and zero otherwise. The 
2
( 1) β χ , 
2
y(1) χ  et 
2
(1) λ χ  test 
statistics  are  used  to  test  the  null  hypothesis  that  1 2 3 0 β β β + + = ,  that  1 2 3 0 γ γ γ + + =   and  that 
1 2 3 0 λ λ λ + + = , respectively. The test statistics
2
( 2 ) β χ , 
2
y( 2 ) χ  and 
2
( 3 ) λ χ  are used to test the null hypothesis 
that  ( j ) 0 β =  for all j,  ( j ) 0 γ =  for all j and  ( j ) 0 λ =  for all j, respectively. The 
2
βγ χ  test statistic is used to 
test the null hypothesis  that 1 2 3 1 2 3 β β β γ γ γ + + = + + . The p value is  the  probability  of  obtaining the 
value of the corresponding test statistic or higher under the null hypothesis.  
 
4.3. Overconfidence and volatility   
Table 5 reports the results from estimating Eq. (10) and Eq. (11). It is seen that the effect of 
unrelated  overconfidence  variable  on  stocks  volatility,  measured  by 3 f   parameter,  is  significantly 
positive  for  EGARCH  model.  Concerning  overconfidence  effect  on  volatility,  the  statically 
significance of the estimated 4 f  parameter, for the EGARCH model, associated with the rejection of 
null hypothesis that  3 4 f f = suggests that overconfidence bias contributes to the return volatility on 
French securities market. 
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Table 5. Relationship between conditional volatility and trading volume  
 
  ARMA-EGARCH  ARMA-GJR-GARCH 
ω (t stat)   0.0531         ( 0.556)  0.0357
***      (19.425)
 
1 f  (t stat)   0.3567
***    ( 11.440)  0.3511
***     (17.784) 
κ (θ ) (t stat)   0.1386        ( 0.3483)  0.0459       (0.2868) 
2 f  (t stat)  0.8671
***      (22.572)  0.8754
***   (7.4517) 
3 f  (t stat)  0.0089
**       (1.684)  0.0001       (1.380) 
4 f   (t stat)  0.5166
***      (3.641)  0.0023       (1.136) 




This table reports the results of conditional variance equation estimate of the ARMA (1.1) 
EGARCH (1.1) and ARMA (1.1) GJR GARCH (1.1) models. 
t t t r   η = +  
  ( ) ( ) t t t 1 t 2 t 1 t 2 t V , , ,.....,r ,r GED 0,h , η η η − − − − :                             
t 1 t 1
t 1 2 t 1 3 t 4 t
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t t t r   η = +                                                                                                                              
( ) t t t 1 t 2 t 1 t 2 t V , , .........,r ,r .... GED(0,h ), η η η − − − − :  
2 2
t t t 1 2 t 1 t 1 t 1 h f ( ) f h S ( ) ω η θ η
−
− − − − = + + + + 3 t 4 f NONOVER f OVER +  
 
where  t V is  the  market    trading  volume  (Tovt  or  Volt)  and rt  is  the market  return.  OVERt   is  the 
component  of  t V related  to  lagged  market  returns  at  month  t,  NONOVERt  is  the  component  of 




t j t j j t j t t t
j 1 j 1
V r r OVER NONOVER α β β α ε − −
= =
 
= + = + + = +  
  ∑ ∑  
 
The 
2 χ  test statistic with one degree of freedom is used to test the null hypothesis that 3 4 f f = , 
and the p value is the probability of obtaining the value of the
2 χ  test statistic or higher under the null 
hypothesis. 
Note: ***, **, denote significant at the 1%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
5. Conclusion  
There is a growing literature showing that the overconfidence bias is useful for explaining 
many asset pricing anomalies. Using French stock market data, this paper provides an evaluation of 
the overconfidence empirical implications. 
The analysis of the returns impulse responses to the private and public information shocks 
shows  that  these  returns  overreact  to  private  information  and  underreact  to  public  information. 
Preceded by an initial underreaction, this overreaction is followed by a correction process reaching 
the stocks prices to the equilibrium. Price behavior in response to private and public information is in 
favor  of  our  first  hypothesis  that  overconfident  investors  overreact  to  private  information  and 
underreact to public information.  
Granger causality tests of stock returns and trading volume estimation show that after high 
returns  subsequent  trading  volume  will  be  higher  as  investment  success  increases  the  degree  of   24 
overconfidence.  This  result  is  consistent  with  our  second  overconfidence  hypothesis  that 
overconfident investors trade more (less) aggressively in periods subsequent to market gains (losses).  
To  see  whether  self attribution  bias  causes  investors’  overconfidence,  we  investigate  the 
investors’ reaction to market gain when they make right and wrong forecasts. Investor’s forecasts of 
future stock returns and forecast errors are derived from two GARCH specifications that allow for 
asymmetric shocks to volatility. We find that when investors make right forecasts of future returns, 
they become overconfident and trade more in subsequent time periods. On the other hand, when they 
make  wrong  forecasts,  their  overconfidence  may  fall  modestly.  This  finding  provides  empirical 
evidence in support of our third hypothesis that self attribution bias, conditioned by right investors’ 
forecasts, increases their overconfidence and their trading volume.  
Finally, we study the relation between excessive trading volume of overconfidence investors 
and excessive prices volatility. The trading volume is decomposed into a first variables related to 
overconfidence and  a  second variable unrelated to investors’ overconfidence. The analysis of the 
relation between return volatility and these two variables shows that conditional volatility is positively 
related to trading volume caused by overconfidence bias. This result is in favor of overconfidence 
contribution to prices excessive volatility. 
Generally, our results provide strong statistical support to the presence of overconfidence bias 
among investors in French stocks market. This psychological bias constitutes a confirmed explanation 
of the most stylized market anomalies. 
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